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MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. VI
CASE NO. 6

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
-againstCARL KRAUCH et al

DISSENTING OPINION
By
JUDGE PAUL M. HEBERT
on
COUNT THREE OF THE INDICTMENT

UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL VI
PALACE OF JUSTICE, BURNBERG, GERMANY
Case No. 6
THE UNITED STATES OF AMARICA
-vsCARL KRAUCH, HERMANN SCHMITZ, GEORG VIN
SCHNITZLER, FRITZ GAJEWSKI, HEINRICH HOERLEIN,
AUGUST VON KNIERIEM, FRITZ TER MEER, CHRISTIAN
SCHNEIDER, OTTO AMBROS, ERNST BUERGIN, HEINRICH
BUETEFISCH, PAUL HAEFLIGER, MAX ILGNER, FRIEDRICH
JAEHNE, HANS KUEHNE, CARL LAUTENSCHLAEGER,
WILHELM MANN, HEINRICH OSTER, KARL WURSTER,
WALTER DUERRFELD, HEINRICH GATTINEU, ERICH VON
DER HEYDE, AND HANS KUGLER, officials of I.G.
FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Defendants
DISSENTING OPINION
Count Three of the Indictment
This dissenting opinion is filed pursuant to reservations made
at the time of the rendition of the final judgment by Military Tribunal
VI in this case. Under Count Three of the indictment, all defendants
are charged with having committed War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity as defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. It is
alleged in the indictment that the defendants participated in the
enslavement and deportation to slave labor on a gigantic scale of
members of the civilian population of countries and territories under
the belligerent occupation of, or otherwise controlled by Germany;
that the defendants participated in the enslavement of concentration
camp inmates, including German nationals; that the defendants
participated in the use of prisoners of war in war operations and work
having a direct relation to war operations, including the manufacture
and transportation or war material and equipment; and, that the
defendants participated in the mis-

treatment, terrorization, torture, and murder of enslaved persons.
It is alleged that all defendants committed War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity as enumerated, in that they were
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting
part in, were connected with plans and enterprises involving,
and were members of organizations or groups including Farben,
which were connected with the commission of said crimes.
There are general allegations that the defendants acted through
the corporate instrumentality, I.G. Farbenindustrie, A.G. in the
commission of said crimes.
The Tribunal convicted the defendant Krauch, ter Meer,
Ambros, Buetefisch and Duerrfeld under this count principally
for initiative shown in the procurement of slave labor for the
construction of Farben's Buna plant at Auschwitz. The
remaining defendants were all acquitted of the charges under
Count Three. Included in the group of acquitted defendants were
fifteen members of the Vorstand, or principal governing
corporate board of Farben. The acquitted Vorstand members
included: Schmitz, von Schnitzler, Buergin, Haeflinger, Ilgner,
Jaehne, Oster, Gajewski, Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Schneider,
Kuehne, Lautenschlseger, Mann and Wurster. The majority
opinion concedes, and, in fact, it is not seriously converted in
this case, that slave labor, i.e., compulsory foreign workers,
concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war were
employed and utilized on a wide scale throughout numerous
plants of the vast Farben organization and that such utilization
was known by the defendants. The majority reached the
conclusion that, except in the case of Auschwitz where initiative
constituting and willing cooperation by Farben with the slave
labor program was held to have been proved, no criminal
responsibility resulted for participation in the utilization of slave
labor. Basically, the majority opinion under Count Three
concluded that, in order to meet

fixed production quotas set by the Reich, "Farben yielded to the
pressure of the Reich labor office and utilized involuntary
foreign workers in many its plants." The majority assert that
"The utilization of forced labor, unless done under such
circumstances as to relieve the employer of responsibility,
constitutes a violation of that part of Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10, which recognizes as war crimes and
crimes against humanity the enslavement, deportation, or
imprisonment of the civilian population of other countries." But
the majority fully accepts the defense contention that the
utilization of slave labor by Farben (except in the case of
Auschwitz) was the result of the compulsory production quotas
and other obligatory governmental decrees and regulations
directing the use of slave labor. The asserted defense of
"necessary" is held to have been sustained because of the reign
of terror within the Reich and because of possible dire
consequences to the defendants had they pursued any other
policy than that of compliance with the slave labor system of the
Third Reich.
I concur in the conviction of the five defendants found
guilty by the Tribunal, but I am of the opinion that the criminal
responsibility goes much further than merely embracing the five
defendants most immediately connected with the construction of
Farben's Auschwitz plant. In my view all the members of the
Farben Vorstand should be held guilty under Count Three of the
indictment not only for the participation by Farben in the crime
of enslavement at Auschwitz, but also for Farben's widespread
participation and willing cooperation with the slave labor system
in the other Farben plants where utilization of forced labor in
violation of the well-settled principles of internation[al] law
recognized in Control Council Law No. 10 has been so
conclusively shown. I disagree with the conclusion that the
defense of necessity is applicable to the facts proved in this case.

While it is true that there were numerous governmental
decrees under which complete control of the manpower supply
was assumed by the Reich Government, existence of such
controls does not, in my opinion, establish the defense of
necessity even under the conditions which existed in Nazi
Germany. Recognition of such a defense is, in my view, utterly
inconsistent with the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10
which indicate quite clearly that Governmental compulsion is
merely a matter to be considered in mitigation and does not
establish a defense to the facts of guilt. Thus Section 4(b) of
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 provides:
"The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of
his Government or a superior does not free him from
responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in
mitigation."
Under the evidence it is clear that the defendants in
utilizing slave labor which is conceded to be a war crime (in the
case of non German nationals) and a crime against humanity,
did not, as they assert, in fact, act exclusively because of the
compulsion and coercion of the existing Governmental
regulations and policies. The record does not establish by any
substantial credible proof that any of the defendants were
actually opposed to the Governmental solutions of the
manpower problems reflected in these regulations. On the
contrary, the record shows that Farben willingly cooperated and
gladly utilized each new source of manpower as it developed.
Disregard of basic human rights did not deter these defendants.
At times they expressed concern over the inefficiency of
compulsory labor but they willingly cooperated in the tyrannical
system. Far from establishing that the defendants acted under
"necessity" or "coercion" in this regard, I conclude from the
record that Farben accepted and frequently sought the forced
workers, including compulsory foreign workers, concentration
camp inmates

and prisoners of war for armament work because there was no
other solution to the manpower needs. Farben and these
defendants wanted to meet production quotas in aid of the
German war effort. In fact, the production quotas of Farben
were largely fixed by Farben itself because Farben was
completely integrated with the entire German program of war
production. Farben's planners, led by defendant Krauch, geared
Farben's potentialities to actual war needs. It is totally irrevelant
[irrelevant] that the defendants might have preferred German
workers. That they would have preferred not to commit a crime
is no defense to its commission. The important fact is that
Farben's Vorstand willingly cooperated in utilizing forced labor.
They were not forced to do so. I cannot agree that there was an
absence of moral choice. In utilizing slave labor within Farben
the will of the actors coincided with the will of those controlling
the Government and who had directed or ordered the doing of
criminal acts. Under these circumstances the defense of
necessity is certainly not admissible.
I am convinced that persons in the positions of power and
influence of these defendants might in numberless was have
avoided the widespread participation in the slave labor
utilization that was prevalent throughout the Farben
organization. I cannot agree with the assertion that these
defendants had no other choice than to comply with the
mandates of the Hitler government. Had there been any real will
to resist such comprehensive participation in the crime of
enslavement, the defendants, possessing superior knowledge in
their respective complicated technical fields, could no doubt
have avoided such participation through a variety of devices of
such imperceptible nature as to avoid the drastic results now
portrayed in the posing of this defense. In reality, the defense is
an after-thought, the

validity of which is belied by Farben's entire course of action.
To assert that Hitler would have "welcomed the opportunity to
make an example of a Farben leader" is, in my opinion, pure
speculation and does not establish the defense of necessity on
the facts here involved.
The defense of necessity as accepted by the majority
would, in my opinion, lead logically to the conclusion that Hitler
alone was responsible for the major was crimes and crimes
against humanity committed during the Nazi regime. If the
defense of superior orders or coercion, as directed in the Chapter
of the IMT, was not recognized in the case of the principal
defendants tried by that Tribunal as applied to defendants who
were subject to strict military discipline and subject to the most
severe penalties for failure to carry out the criminal
plans decreed and evolved by Hitler, it become difficult to
ascertain how any such defense can be admitted in the case of
the present defendants. The IMT judgment embraces no
doctrinal defense of necessity by governmental coercion. That
decision, it seems to me, constitutes complete negation of any
such theory. Nor do I consider the precedent established
byMilitary Tribunal No. IV in the case of the United States v.
Flickm [Flick] et al (Case No. 5) persuasive in its recognition of
the defense of "necessity". Such a doctrime [doctrine]
constitutes, in my opinion, unbridled license for the commission
of war crimes and crimes against humanity on the broadest
possible scale through the simple expedience of the issuance of
compulsory governmental regulations combined with the
terrirism [terrorism] of the totalitarian or police state. The
essence of a truly effective system of international penal law lies
in its applicability to the acts of individuals who are nor
privileged to disregard the over-riding commands of
international law ehen [even] they come in conflict with the
contrary policies or directives of a State nor desiring to abide by
the principles of inter-

national law. For these reasons, I have no hesitancy in rejecting
the conclusions reached in the Flick case on this asserted
defense and cannot agree with the majority in this application to
the facts here proven.
In effect the majority opinion holds that, regardless of the
extent of Farben's participation in the slave labor program,
unless a particular defendant can be shown to have (a) exercised
unusual initiative to bring about participation in the utilization of
slave labor, no crime has been committed; or (b) unless a
defendant in the course of the administration of his particular
role in the slave labor program shows an initiative going beyond
the requirements of the cruel regulations no crime has been
committed. Under this construction Farben's complete
integration into production planning, which virtually meant that
it set its own production quotas, is not considered as "exercising
initiative." Even the Flick case did not go so far. Action by a
defendant in requesting the allocation of labor, knowing that
compulsory foreign workers would be assigned, is considered by
the majority to be done pursuant to and under "necessity" and
does not result in criminal liability. Under the majority view a
defendant who is a plant manager may willingly cooperate in the
execution of cruel and inhumane regulations, such, for example,
as putting into effect the required discriminations as to food and
clothing in the case of the Eastern workers, or putting the
miserable workers beyond barbed wair [wire] fences; this was
no more than complying with the requirements of the
Governmental regulations and, according to the majority
opinion, does not result in criminal responsibility. Similarly,
where the evidence establishes that a defendant was responsible
for the erection of a disciplinary camp at Farben plant or
participated in the initiation of disciplinary measures against
unruly compulsory workers-

there is no criminal responsibility, the action is protected by the
defense of "necessity" as the defendant did no more than that
which the cruel and inhumane regulations required. Slave
laborers might be reported to the Gestapo for punishment as this
was required by the regulations and the defendant is not
considered responsible. It cannot be successfully contended that
this was done in the Farben plants employing slave labor. I
cannot concur in such results. The coercion exercised by a
totalitarian police state in the form of commands to its citizens
should not be permitted to operate as a complete negation of the
occpsing command of international penal law which has erected
standards for the protection of basic human rights. Accessories
and those taking a consenting part in the crime of enslavement
should not be afforded such easy means or purging themselves
of the fact of guilt. On the facts proven in this record, I am
convinced that the defendants who were members of the
Vorstand were accessories to and took a consenting part in the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as
alleged in Count Three of the indictment.
Conceding arguendo the admissibility of the defense of
necessity, as a matter of law, it is clearly not here admissible to
result in acquittal of all defendants in the light of the finding of
the majority as to Farben's initiative at Auschwitz. All
defendants who were members of Vorstand should share in the
responsibility for the exercise of such initiative. The majority
concedes such initiative to have existed at Auschwitz, as it was
planned from the inception of the Farben Auschwitz Buna plant
to use concentration camp labor on the project. I consider it
unreasonable to conclude that these plans were not known by all
Vorstand members. The majority opinion recognizes that
Duerrfeld, Ambros, Krauch, ter Meer,

and Buetefisch must bear responsibility for taking the initiative in the
unlawful employment of forced workers at Auschwitz and that they, to
some extent at least, must share the responsibility for the mistreatment
of the workers with the SS and the construction contractors. The
criminal responsibility so found should embrace all Vorstand members
for the occurrences at Auschwitz. With regard to the numerous other
plants in which slave labor was employed by Farbenm [Farben] no
substantial factual distinction exists from that prevailing at Auschwitz,
in the matter of Farben's cooperative attitude.
As to the employment of forced workers at Auschwitz after the
Sauckel program of forced labor became effective, the majority
opinion states:
"The defendants contend that, the recruitment of labor being
under direct control of the Reich, they did not know the
conditions under which the recruitment took place, and since
the foreign workers at first were procured on a voluntary basis,
the defendants were unaware later that the method had been
changed and that many of the sequent workers had been
procured through a system of forced labor recruitment. This
contention cannot be successfully maintained. The labor for
Auschwitz was procured through the Reich Labor Office at
Farben's request. Forced labor was used for a period of
approximately three years, from 1942 until the end of the war.
It is clear that Farben did not prefer either the employment of
concentration-camp workers of those foreign nationals who had
been compelled against their will to enter German labor
service. On the other hand, it is equally evident that Farben
accepted the situation that was presented to it through the Labor
Office of the Reich and that when free workers, either German
or foreigners, were unobtainable they sought the employment
and utilization of people who came to them through the
services of the concentration camp Auschwitz and Sauckel's
forced-labor program."
The foregoing analysis of the responsibility for utilization of
forced labor at Auschwitz is equally applicable to slave labor
utilization at the other Farben plants where the situation identical in
fact. Willing cooperation with the slave labor utilization of the Third
Reich was a matter of corporate policy that permeated the

whole Farben organization. The Vorstand was responsible for
the policy. For this reason, criminal responsibility goes beyond
the actual immediate participants at Auschwitz. It includes other
Farben Vorstand plant-managers and embraces all who
knowingly participated in the shaping of the corporate policy. I
find on the evidence that all Vorstand members must share the
responsibility for the approval of the policy despite the fact that
there were varying degrees of immediate connection among
various defendants. The "freedom and opportunity for initiative"
found to exist at Auschwitz was, in my opinion, eually [equally]
present at the other plants. I find it hard to understand why the
majority can conclude that construction and production at
Auschwitz was not under Reich compulsion when the Reich
wanted the plant for war production and directed its erection,
and production involving utilization of slave labor in other
plants was "under compulsion." The answer, it seems to me, les
in fact that the freedom was as real in all the Farben plants and
the similar attitude of willing cooperation was present –
differing at Auschwitz only in the matter of degree. The
majority opinion concludes that the defendant Krauch was a
willing participant in the crime of enslavement. With that
conclusion I agree, but the mere fact that Krauch was a
governmental official operating at a high policy level is
insufficient, in my opinion, to distinguish his willing
participation is the crime of enslavement from other degrees of
willing participation exhibited by the other defendants according
to their respective roles within Farben.
Criminal liability is not to be imputed to the officer of a
corporation merely by virtue of his occupancy of his office.
Generally a corporate officer is not criminally liable for the
corporate acts performed by other agents or officers of a
corporation. But the action of an officer

of a corporation may result in criminal liability where, by virtue
of the officer's individual act, by may be said to have authorized,
ordered, abetted or otherwise has actually participated in a
course of action which is criminal in character. The criminal
intent required as a pre-requisite to guilt under the charges of
war crimes, and crimes against humanity alleged in Count Three
of the instant indictment is present if the corporate officer
knowingly authorizes the corporate participation in action of a
criminal character. On this score the evidence is more than
sufficient. From the time of the participation by Farben in
Auschwitz project, the corporation was actively engaged in
continuing criminal offences which constituted participation in
war crimes and crimes against humanity on a broad scale and
under circumstances such as to make it impossible for the
corporate officers not to know the character of the activities
being carried on by Farben at Auschwitz. From the outset of the
project it was known that slave labor including use of
concentration camp inmates would be a principal source of the
labor supply for the project. Utilization of such labor was
approved as a matter of corporate policy. To permit the
corporate instrumentality to be as a cloak to insulate the
principle corporate officers who approved and authorized this
course of action from any criminal responsibility which, in my
opinion, is without any sound precedent under the most
elementary concepts of criminal law. It represents a doctrime
[doctrine] which should not be permitted to gain a foothold in
the application of criminal sanctions to the acts of individuals
who are charged with such serious infractions of international
penal law. The law does not require the degree of personal
participations in the execution of cromes [crimes] against
international law that I understand the majority opinion to
require. It matters not that, under the division

of labor employed by I.G. Farben, supervision of the Auschwitz
project fell in the sphere of immediate activity of certain of the
defendants, i.e., ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch, and Duerrfeld. In
my view, the Auschwitz project would not have been carried out
had it not have been authorized and approved by the other
defendants who participated in the corporate approval of the
project knowing that the concentration camp inmates and other
slave labor would be employed in the construction and other
work. We do not have in this case situation of complete
delegation of authority to subordinate without knowledge of the
criminal character of the action to be undertaken by those
granting the authority for corporate action.
We do not have the situation of subordinates committing
offences against criminal law on their own initiative without the
knowledge of the corporate officers. Decisions in AngloAmerican law which decline to impose a vicarious criminal
liability in such situation are not, therefore, strictly in point.
There is, however, respectable authority for the imposition of
criminal responsibility where the defendant was in a position to
know and should have not of the illegal action carried out by a
corporation through an agent. An analogy in Anglo-American
law may be found in decisions dealing with the employment of
child labor. For example, in the case of Overland Cotton Mill
Co. et al v. People. 32 Colorado 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904) the
conviction of an assistant plant superintendent for violation of
the child labor laws was sustained by the court despite the fact
that he was not shown to have personally participated in the
hiring of the minor. In discussing the liability of this officer, the
court said:

"…An agent of a corporation is presumed to have that
knowledge of its affairs particularly under his control and
management which, by the exercise of due diligence, he
would have ascertained…He (the assistant superintendent)
was engaged at the mill, and, in the performance of his duties,
had the authority to hire and discharge employees. It thus
appears from the testimony that by reason of his relationships
to the company, and the performance of his duties he either
knew, or, by the exercise of due diligence upon his part,
should have know, that a minor under the prohibited age was
in the employ of the company. For this reason he must be held
as having violated the relationship he bore to the company, to
have prevented the employment. An officer of a corporation,
through whose act the corporation commits an offence against
the laws of the state, in himself also guilty on the same
offence."
In this case offenses against international law (to which the
defense of necessity in not applicable) were committed by Farben, the
corporate instrumentality through which the individual defendants
acted in consummating such criminal acts. The defendants who were
members of the Vorstand of Farben and who were plant managers
certainly knew of and were active participants in the slave labor
utilization. At the very least, they took a consenting part in war
crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council
Law No. 10. These plant managers not only knew of the action but
they participated in executing and formulating the policies within
Farben under which such action was taken. There is no sound reason,
under the evidence, to render a judgment of exculpation in the case of
the defendants who were plant managers at Farben plants employing
slave labor. The other defendants who were not plant managers but
were members of the Vorstand were likewise apprised of and took a
consenting part in approving and directing the policies under which
Farben participated in the slave labor program on such a broad scale.
They, too, should be held criminally liable. Essentially, we have
action by corporate board, participated in by its members, authorizing
the violation of international law by other subordinate agents of the
corporation.

Under the evidence presented there can be no doubt that
the Farben Vorstand was responsible for general employment
policies as well as the welfare of its workers. This responsibility
was recognized in the Law Regulating National Labor and by
the action of the Vorstand of Farben taken under the law to
discharge its responsibilities in this regard. The appointment of
the defendant Schneider at the Main Plant Leader of Farben was
pursuant to this responsibility of the Vorstand and was in
conformity with the mentioned law. Schneider frequently
reported to members of the Vorstand and its committiies
[comities] on the matter of labor policy.
The evidence shows Farben's willing cooperation in the
utilization of forced foreign workers, prisoners of war and
concentration camp inmates as a matter of conscious corporate
policy. For example, in a report made by the defendant Schmitz,
as Chairman of the Vorstand, to the Augsichtsrat (Supervisory
Board) on 11 July 1941, Schmitz stated:
"The factories have to make all efforts to get the
necessary workers; byt [by] utilizing foreign workers and
prisoners of war the demand could be generally met."
This report was after the 1939 German decree introducing labor
in Poland. The evidence shows that Farben took the initiative to
obtain Polish workers and that such workers were actually
employed as early as 1940. In the light of the historical facts
establishing the compulsory nature of the slave labor program of
Nazi Germany, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
Polish workers included large numbers of enslaved persons. It is
further certain that of the voluntary foreign workers originally
employed many were later prohibited from leaving their
employment had they chosen to do so. This also constituted
enslavement. The subsequent retention of such workers in a
state of

servitude constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity in
violation of Control Council Law No. 10.
Farben's willing cooperation with the slave labor program
continued even after its inhumane character became more
evident with the appointment of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary
General for the Utilization of Labor. On 30 May 1942, the
defendant Schmitz again reported to the Aufsichtsrat that the
lack of workers had to be compensated by the employment of
foreigners and prisoners of war. A credible witness, Struss,
stated that practically everubody [everybody] in Germany knew
that Russian workers were forced to come to Germany after the
battle of Kiev. The members of Farben's Vorstand, therefore,
necessary knew that such forced workers were being employed
by Farben and they approved and cooperated in the execution of
such a labor policy. It is highly unrealistic to say, as important
as labor procurement was to the vital matter of German war
production, that persons occupying the positions of influence
and responsibility of a Vorstand member of Farben were not
well informed concerning the policies of the compulsory labor
program in which Farben participated on such a large scale. It is
not necessary for the evidence to establish that each defendant
was informed of all the details of each major instance of such
employment and personally exercised initiative. There is an
abundance of evidence from which knowledge of the
widespread participation by Farben as a matter of official
corporate policy, sanctioned and approved by the individual
Vorstand members, is conclusively to be inferred. For example,
the Vorstand and its subsidiary committees had to approve the
allocation of funds for the housing of compulsory workers. This
meant that members of the Vorstand had to know the extend of
Farben's willing cooperation in participating in the slave labor
program and had to take an individual part in furthering the
program.

As to the Auschwitz Buna plant, the evidence
conclusively establishes that Farben took the initiative in the
selection of the Auschwitz site and that an important factor, if
not the decisive one, was the knowledge of availability of
concentration camp inmates of work in the construction of the
plant. As pointed out by the majority opinion, it was
contemplated from the start that concentration camp labor would
be used in such work. But, in my view, the individual liability
for the carrying out of such plans goes further than the
individual acts and actions of Krauch, Ambros, ter Meer,
Buetefisch and Duerrfeld. In discussing the criminal
responsibility of the defendant ter Meer, the Tribunal quite
properly asserts that it would be unreasonable to conclude that
conferences between the defendant Ambros and ter Meer did not
include discussions of the all-important question of labor supply
for the construction of the Auschwitz Buna plant and that it was
consequently know to ter Meer that officials in charge of the
Auschwitz plant construction were taking the initiative in
planning for and availing themselves of the use of
concentration-camp labor. With this conclusion, I agree but, in
my opinion, it is similarly unreasonable to conclude that the
reports to the Vorstand on the Auschwitz project ignored these
matters. Just as ter Meer was superior of Ambros, the Vorstand
was the superior of both and there is no reason to conclude that
the knowledge possessed by Ambros and ter Meer was not fully
reported to and discussed in the Vorstand. There is, indeed,
strong positive evidence that this was done and that it must have
been done is a proper influence of fact to be drawn from the
very nature of the serious responsibility being undertaken by
Farben in becoming involved in the slave labor utilization to the
extent that it did at Auschwitz.

The defendant Gajewski, Hoerlein, Buergin, Jahne,
Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Schneider and Wurster, in their
capacities as plant leaders or managers of one or more of the
important plants of Farben and as members of the Technical
Committee participated in the utilization of slave labor, in plants
under their jurisdiction, and actively participated in furthering
the policy of slave labor utilization within the Farben
enterprises. They should all the held guilty under Count Three of
the indictment.
Although the dutires [duties] of the defendant Schmitz,
von Schnitzler, von Knieriem, Haeflinger, Ilgner, Mann and
Oster were not directly related to the management of any
specific plant or project in which slave labor was employed,
they did know of the policy throughout the Farben organization.
As members of the Vorstand, they tacitly approved such policy.
In my view, it is not necessary for them as individuals
personally to take the initiative in procurement or allocation of
such labor. It suffices that they knowingly approved of the
policy of slave labor utilization and that is, I conclude,
abundantly established by the record.
A construction project of the magnitude of Auschwitz
could not have been initiated unless adequate reports were made
to the Vorstand on the more important factors which influence
the selection of an industrial site including the sources of and
availability of labor. I am convinced that Krauch spoke the truth
in his pre-trial affidavit when he stated that Farben could agree
to or refuse to erect the Buna plant at Auschwitz; that the site
was selected by Ambros and report was made to the Farben
Vorstand of the factors considered, including labor; and that the
members of the Executive Board of Farben (Vorstand) "were
informed of the employment of concentration camp inmates
with the I.G. Buna plant at Auschwitz and did not protest." In

other words, there can be no doubt that the Farben Vorstand
approved the policy of employing concentration camp inmates
in the erection of the Auschwitz Buna plant and did not object as
it was their duty to do.
This, in my opinion, constitutes affirmative action of
approval by the members of the Vorstand and leads inescapably
to their criminal complicity within the degree of participation
required by Control Council Law No. 10, as constituting taking
a consenting part in the action. I cannot agree with the majority
that it is necessary for the evidence to show an abnormal degree
of initiative on the part of each defendant in seeking such labor
or in participating in negotiations to obtain it. These are matters
far bellow the policy level at which many of the defendants
operated. But it suffices that they knew the policy and tacitly
approved. Certain of the defendants were more intimately
concerned with the execution of the project than others, but that
does not, in any sense, detract from the complicity of the other
corporate officials, sitting on the governing boar or Vorstand of
Farben, and who are shown by the evidence to have know what
was in progress and who gave their consent thereto by their
inaction and acquiescence and by not objecting. Corroborating
evidence is found in the pre-trial affidavits of defendants
Buetefisch and Schneider. Furthermore, members of the
Technical Committee (TEA), including defendants ter Meer,
Schneider, Buetefisch, Ambros, Lautenschlaeger, Jaehne,
Hoerlein, Kuehne, Buergin, Gajewski, and von Knieriem (as
guest) participated in meetings at which reports were made on
the Auschwitz project and huge appropriations were made for
the work. It taxes credulity to say that these important corporate
officials were not informed in a general way of the major
developments in the all-important matter of labor procurement. I
conclude, form the evidence, that they were bound to know, as a
pre-

requisits to the proper discharge of their duties, of such a major
development as the Goering Order of 18 February 1941, issued
at the request of the defendant Krauch and addressed to
Reichsfuehrer SS. Himmler directed directing that concentration
camp inmates be made available for the construction of the
Buna plant at Auschwitz. There is, in my opinion, absolutely no
merit to the defense that the defendants were "forced" to use
concentration camp inmates, or that they were ignorant of
Farben's plans being executed at Auschwitz.
The true attitude of Farben and the flimsy character of the
defense of coercion and necessity asserted by the defendants is
best illustrated by defendant Krauch's letter to Himmler written
in July 1943 wherein Krauch write that he was
"particularly pleased to hear that during this discussion
you hinted that you may possibly aid the expansion of
another synthetic factory…in a similar way as was done
at Auschwitz by making available inmates of your camps,
if necessary. I have also written to Minister Speer to this
effect and would be grateful if you would continue
sponsoring and aiding us in this matter."
I conclude that all members of the Vorstand viewed the
availability of such labor and its subsequent employment at
Auschwitz as an "assistance" to Farben and all defendants must
share in the responsibility for its utilization. The evidence
established that consistent procedures for dissemination of
information among key Farben personnel were regularly
followed as a matter of policy. It is certain that, through this
medium, at the very minimum, knowledge came to the more
important Farben officials of the extent of Farben's participation
in the slave labor utilization at Auschwitz. The increase in
inmates at Auschwitz from seven hundred in 1941 to more than
seven thousand by the end of 1943 could nor have been
unknown to the defendants who were members of Farben's
Vorstand.

Having accepted a large scale participation in the
utilization of concentration camp inmates at Auschwitz, and,
acting through certain of its agents, having exercised initiative in
negotiating with the SS to obtain more and more workers,
Farben became inevitably connected with the inhumanity
involved in the utilization of such labor. This majority opinion,
in effect, by recognizing the defense of necessity, implies that if
defendants in the operation of the slave labor program did no
more that the cruel and inhuman regulations prescribed, those
participating in the utilization of labor under such condition of
servitude are not responsible therefore. I cannot agree. The
evidence establishes that the conditions at Auschwitz were
inhumane in an extreme degree. It is no overstatement, as the
prosecution asserts, to calculate that the working conditions
indirectly resulted in the deaths of thousands of human beings.
These defendants may not, themselves, have subjectively willed
the deaths of the unfortunate victims, who were subsequently
exterminated by the SS in the gas chambers, but their part in the
utilization of the inmates under such conditions was a link of the
entire hideous criminal enterprise and I cannot minimize in the
slightest degree the heavy responsibility which Farben and its
responsible concentration camp, Monowitz, in 1942. Funds for
this purpose were appropriated by the TEA and the Vorstand
after consideration the need – showing again the widespread
knowledge within Farben of the extent of utilization of the
concentration camp inmates.
The extreme cold, the inadequacy of the food, the
rigorous nature of the work, the cruel treatment of the workers
by their supervisors, combine to present a picture

of horror which, I am convinced, has not been at all overdrawn
by the prosecution and which is fully sustained by the evidence.
The living and working conditions were in truth unendurable
and, as these inmates were engaged in Farben's business, it was
the responsibility of Farben to correct the situation. Such efforts
at amelioration of conditions as were attempted to be shown, fall
short of any adequate effort to meet the real responsibility
imposed on Farben in this regard. It must be borne in mind that
these men were misused as slaves by Farben, through Farben's
own initiative and out of Farben's desire to utilize them as
means of furthering the building of a plant whose immediate
purpose was to be war production but was to be iftted [fitted]
into the longe [long]- range plans of Farben's domination of the
eastern economic area. Consequently, in view of the degree of
the initiative, the duty to the workers must be regarded as a
higher dity [duty]. Farben's efforts fall far short of the
requirement.
Among the credible witnesses whose testimony was
offered to the Tribunal were a number of British prisoners of
war who described the pitiable lot of the inmates working on the
Farben site at Auschwitz. There was highly credible evidence
from these eye-witnesses to established – that the inmates were
skinny and not physically fit for the work they were forced to
do; that their appearance was such as to make it hard to believe
that they were human beings; that they all suffered from
malnutrition; that the so-called "buna soup" was thin and watery
and inadequate; that the inmates were being starved to death. I
am convinced from this evidence that Farben did not discharge
the high responsibility imposed upon it in the matter of seeing
that its compulsory workers were adequately fed, and
responsibility for this situation cannot be shifted by the
defendants to the SS and the Farben sub-contractors.

The evidence further establishes conclusively that the
working conditions on the Farben construction site at Auschwitz
were inhuman. The miserable inmates were forced to work
beyond their physical capacities. They were subjected to
rigorous discipline in the performance of work assignments and
there was a direct relationship between the requirements set by
Farben and the ill-treatment accorded the inmates by the SS. The
son of the defendant Jaehne has testified:
"Of all the people employed in I.G. Auschwitz, the
inmates received the worse treatment. They were beaten
by the capos, who in their turn had to see to it that the
amount of work prescribed them and their detachments
by the I.G. foreman was carried out, because otherwise
they were punished by being beaten in the evening in the
Monowitz Camp. A general driving system prevailed in
the I.G. construction site, so that one cannot say that the
capos alone were to blame. The capos drove the inmates
in their detachments exceedingly hard, in self-defense, so
to speak, and did not shrink from using any means of
increasing the work of the inmates, just so long as the
amount of work required was done."
I am convinced that this is a true description of what
actually happened at Auschwitz and from the vast amount of
credible evidence introduced before the Tribunal I am further
convinced that it was true, as contended by the prosecution, that
is was Farben's drive for speed in theconstruction on at
Auschwitz which resulted indirectly in thousands of the inmates
being selected for extermination by the SS when they were
rendered unfit for work. The proof establishes that fear of
expermination [extermination] was used to spur the inmates to
greater efforts and that they undertook tasks beyond their
physical strength as a result of such fear. It is also clear from the
proof that injured or ill inmates frequently refrained from
seeking medical treatment out of fear of being sent for
extermination to the gas chambers at Birkenau.

The defendants, members of the Vorstand, cannot, in my
opinion, avoid sharing a large part of the guilt for these
numberless crimes against humanity. The condition of the
inmates being worked by Farben could not have been unknown
to the principal corporate officials. The truth of the matter is
related by the witness Frost, a British prisoner of war:
"In addition to the I.G. foreman and other officials at
Auschwitz, every once in a while big shots from the main
firm would come down to the plant. In my opinion
nobody who worked at the plant or who came into the
plant on business or inspections could avoid discovering
the facts that the inmates were literally being worked to
death. They had no color in their faces whatsoever. They
were practically living corpses covered with skin and
bones and completely broken in spirit. Everyone who was
there knew that inmates were kept there as long as they
turned out work and that when they were physically
unable to continue, they were disposed of."

In summary, it is established that Farben selected the Auschwitz
site with knowledge of the existence of the concentration camp and
contemplated the use of concentration camp inmates in its construction;
that these matters necessary had to be reported to and discussed by the
Vorstand and the TEA; that Farben initiative obtained the inmates for
work at Auschwitz; that the project was constantly before the members
of the TEA for necessary appropriation of funds; that the TEA had to
have information on the labor aspect of the project to properly perform
its functions; that the condition of the concentration camp inmates was
brought to the attention of the TEA and Vorstand members in various
discussions and reports; that a number of the defendants were actually
eye witnesses to conditions at Auschwitz because of personal visits to
Auschwitz; that the defendants Krauch, von Knieriem, Schneider,
Jaehne, Ambros, Buetefisch, and ter Meer were all shown to have
visited the I.G. Auschwitz site during occurrences of the nature
generally described above; that the conditions at Auschwitz were so
horrible that it is utterly incredible to conclude that they were unknown
to the defendants, the principal corporate directors, who were
responsible for Farben's connection with the project.
A letter written by a Farben employee at I.G. Auschwitz to a
Farben employee at Frankfurt on 30 July 1942 describes the enterprise
in which these defendants must be considered a consenting part as
follows:
"…You can imagine that the population is not going to behave
in a friendly or even correct manner toward the Reich Germans,
especially towards us I.G. people. The only thing that keeps
these filthy people from becoming rebellious is the fact that
armed power (the concentration camp) is in the background. The
evil glances which are occasionally cast at us are not punishable.
Apart from these facts, however, we are quite happy here……
"With a staff of such size, you can well imagine that the number
of accommodation barracks is constantly increasing and that
large city of shacks has developed. In addition to that, there is
the circumstance that some 1,000 foreign workers see to it that
our food supply does not deteriorate. Thus we find Italians,
Frenchmen, Croats, Belgians, Poles, and, as the ‘closest
collaborators' the so-called

criminal prisoners of all shades. That the Jewish race is
playing a special part here you can well imagine. The diet and
treatment of this sort or people is in accordance with our aim.
Evidently, an increase in weight is hardly ever recorded for
them. That bullets start whizzing at the slightest attempt of
a‘change of air' is also certain as well as the fact that many
have already disappeared as a result of a ‘sunstroke.'"
It is contended by the defense that the construction of the
Farben concentration camp Monowitz was to improve the living
standards of concentration camp inmates who formerly lived in the
Auschwitz concentration camp. Such contention is refuted by
contemporaneous documents which establish that far from any such
humanitarian motive the true motive was to obtain the labor which
had been interrupted due to the typhus epidemic of 1942. The
defendant Krauch admitted that Ambros and Buetefisch "proposed to
the executive board of the I.G. to erect the concentration camp
Monowitz within the I.G. territory Auschwitz for reasons of
expediency." I am convinced from the proof that the purpose in
erecting the camp was to obtain the concentration camp labor and to
make it more productive by eliminating the transportation to and from
the main concentration camp. The food system, also pointed to by the
defense, was introduced to increase the output of the workers and was
administered with this as a predominant consideration. Moreover, it
did not actually improve the miserable lot of majority workers. It is
never a defense in criminal case to point to instances in which
criminal action is not involved. The evidence does not convince me of
any serious efforts by Farben to remedy the food situation at
Auschwitz and I am unable to find evidence of a mitigating nature in
this regard.
We have in this case the absurd contention urged that the
fence around the premises of the Farben plant was erected, not for the
purpose of making the servitude of the workers more secure, but for
the purpose of giving the inmates more freedom and keeping the SS
out of the premises. Here, again, the contemporary documents
establish that the purpose of the construction of the fence was to meet
suggestions of the SS that this be done to make possible assignment
of more inmates under conditions requiring fewer guards.

The overwhelming weight of the evidence it to the effect that
the living conditions in Farben's camp Monowitz added greatly to the
misery of the workers. The quarters were overcrowded, the water,
toilet, and other sanitary facilities were inadequate. The devastating
effect of the cold weather upon the under-nourished and
underclothed inmates has, in my opinion, been established by
overwhelming credible proof. The attempt of Farben to ameliorate
this situation by providing winter coats in 1944 shortly before the
evacuation of Auschwitz can hardly be said to operate as exculpation
for the misery and mistreatment as related in the statements on
numerous eye witnesses to these conditions. The defense has
introduced voluminous documents, affidavits, and some testimony in
an attempt to controvert the overwhelming weight of the
prosecution's evidence. I do not consider that this evidence presented
by the defense is sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt on
the subject of mistreatment.
The contemporaneous documents introduces by the defense
fall far short of detracting from the prosecution's proof. On crossexamination by the prosecution, in a sampling process, the defense
affiants who were leading employees of Farben at the Auschwitz site
made numerous damaging admissions seriously detracting from the
weight and credibility of the previous testimony given in their
affidavits. Defense affiants who were called for cross-examination
by the prosecution fell into three categories – those from whom
testimony corroborating the damaging evidence of the prosecution
was obtained on cross-examination; those whose credibility was
completely destroyed on cross-examination; and those affidavits
were withdrawn by the defense, in some instances, even after
appearance at Nurnberg. I conclude that very little weight, is to be
attached to the affidavits introduced by the defense. Unless we are to
resort to weighing the evidence by the bulk number of affidavits, the
prosecution has established Farben's participation in the mistreatment
of the concentration camp inmates at Auschwitz in an aggravated
degree. At the very minimum it was the responsibility of defendants
Schneider and the members of the Vorstand shown to have visited
Auschwitz to have succeeded in correcting these conditions. This,

these defendants did not do, and they should be held criminally
responsible for these aggravations of the crime of enslavement,
in addition to their responsibility for participation in the
utilization of slave labor.
No useful purpose would be served in an analysis of the
evidence in detail as applied to each individual defendant. The
guilt varies in degree with each defendant and his functions in
Farben must be considered. It is untenable, however, in my
opinion, to say that Schmitz, the Chairman of Farben's Vorstand,
bears none of the responsibility for Farben's participation in the
slave labor program, including occurrences at Auschwitz, or that
Schneider, Farben's Main Plant Leader in the labor field in not
responsible. International law cannot possibly be considered as
operating in a complete vacuum of legal irresponsibility – in
which crime on such a broad scale can be actively participated
in by a corporation exercising the power and influence of Farben
without those who are responsible for participating in the
policies being liable therefore. What is true of Schmitz,
Chairman of the Boars, is true of the other managers of Farben
in variety degrees.
Auschwitz has been chosen in this summation as it is the
most aggravated of Farben's many participations in the slave
labor program. In such treatment of the evidence, it must be
noted that the various defendants who were plant managers
were, in most instances, also actively participants in the
utilization of slave labor in plants under their jurisdiction, and in
instances in which this was not the case the defendants knew of,
acquiesced in, and were consequently responsible for the Farben
policy involved in such utilization. To review the evidence in
detail as to each defendant, or as to each Plant Manager, in this
opinion, would lengthen the opinion beyond any reasonable
bounds. With respect to the Western workers employed in
Farben plants, mitigating circumstances have been shown in
regard to the treatment of some of these workers. It suffices,
therefore, to conclude this separate expression of views by

merely stating that I am of the opinion that each defendant who
is a member of the Vorstand should be held guilty under Count
Three of the Indictment and that I disagree with the majority in
the acquittal of defendants Schmitz, von Schnitzler, Gajewski,
Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Schneider, Buergin, Haeflinger, Ilgner,
Jaehne, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Mann, Oster, and Wurster.
These defendants are, in my opinion, guilty subject to such
individual consideration of mitigating circumstances as should
be considered in fixing their punishment.
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